It has been argued that the threat of regulatory intervention a¤ects …rm behavior. We investigate the pricing decision of the dominant …rm under regulatory threat, considering the probability of intervention as a function of the price. Our focus is on the case where the potential divestiture of the …rm serves as a threat of regulatory intervention. Speci…cally, we compare regulatory threat, which can be regarded as uncertain intervention, with deterministic intervention. It is shown that under certain conditions associated with the marginal expected penalty, regulatory threat induces the …rm to lower prices even more than deterministic intervention. Numerical examples illustrate that with relatively small-scale divestiture, the …rm's price under regulatory threat may be lower than that under deterministic intervention within a relatively broad range of regulator's attitudes toward intervention.
Introduction
This paper addresses the hypothesis that the threat of government intervention a¤ects …rms' behavior. Firms would internalize the regulatory threat and change their decisions in order to lower the probability of potential regulatory intervention. More speci…cally, it has been argued that …rms may hold prices down in face of a credible threat of regulatory intervention. Olmstead and Rhode (1985) discuss the situation in the 1920s where some Californian oil companies suppressed gasoline prices, even though the real price of light crude had doubled. They suggest the hypothesis that these oil companies may have feared a hostile response from the government and consequent unfavorable intervention. More recently, Wolfram (1999) investigates the liberalized British electric power industry of the 1990s, and argues that generators may have restrained power prices in an e¤ort to demonstrate that prices were not too high while the regulator's attention focused on the electricity spot market.
The literature includes empirical studies that directly test the hypothesis of regulatory threat in speci…c industries. Using the 1979 oil crisis as a case study, Er ‡e and McMillan (1990) compare the prices charged by companies that di¤ered primarily in their exposure to regulatory threat. They argue that major US oil companies held down product prices under the pressure of threatened government intervention during the price shocks of the late 1970s. They conclude that major oil companies responded to regulatory pressure during a politically sensitive period. Likewise, Dri¢ eld and Ioannidis (2000) observe a long-term decline in pro…t margins in the UK petrol industry as a result of the 1979 Monopolies and Merger Commission investigation, despite the fact that no undertakings were made. On the other hand, Ellison and Wolfram (2006) examine the possible e¤ects of regulatory threat on pharmaceutical prices, focusing on the health care reform period in the US of the early 1990s. They …nd evidence of vulnerable pharmaceutical companies distorting price increases during the early years of the Clinton Administration, possibly altering their price increases to forestall potential regulation.
However, only a small amount of theoretical work analyzes the e¤ects of regulatory threat on …rm behavior. Glazer and McMillan (1992) consider a …rm that is yet unregulated but faces the risk of regulation, and develop a model in which the probability of regulatory intervention is greater the higher the price the …rm charges. They then show that the threat of regula-tion induces a monopolist to charge a price lower than the monopoly price because it signi…cantly reduces the probability of regulatory intervention. They particularly emphasize the marginal e¤ects of changes in price on this probability. Brunekreeft (2004) also considers the probability of regulatory intervention as a function of price, and extends the model in Glazer and McMillan to vertically related markets, focusing on the electricity supply industry in Germany.
In this paper, we present a simple model of regulatory threat that describes the pricing decision of the dominant …rm under uncertain intervention. We de…ne the probability of intervention as a function of the price, as in Glazer and McMillan (1992) . However, our analysis di¤ers from previous work in two major ways. First, our paper develops a model in which the potential divestiture of the …rm serves as regulatory threat. In reality, there has been the tendency of the regulator to examine the divestiture of dominant …rms to mitigate market power in such industries as electric power, gas, and telecommunications industries. We demonstrate how the risk of divestiture a¤ects the pricing decision of the …rm. Second, this paper compares regulatory threat, which can be viewed as uncertain (stochastic) intervention, with one hundred percent certain (deterministic) intervention. The regulator may want to rely on deterministic regulatory intervention to decrease the price. However, we show that under certain conditions, regulatory threat induces the …rm to decrease the price even more than under deterministic intervention.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a simple model of regulatory threat, focusing on the uncertain divestiture of the …rm. Section 3 analyzes the e¤ects of uncertain divestiture on prices. Section 4 provides numerical examples to illustrate the results. Section 5 concludes.
The Model

Overview
It is common in some industries that one or only a few dominant …rms have large market share and exercise market power. Suppose that the regulator (e.g., a market surveillance committee) considers that the price seems to be at a high level, and starts to examine the divestiture of the …rm as a means of regulatory intervention. In some industries, such as the electric power industry, there has been the tendency of the regulator to examine the divestiture of the dominant …rm to mitigate market power.
In our model, the regulator can divest a certain portion of the …rm's plants. This portion is predetermined politically based on some political or legal constraints. If the regulator actually undertakes the divestiture of the …rm, the divested portion will become a competitive fringe …rm, assuming that it will remain small. In this sense, the model can be viewed as an application of a dominant …rm-competitive fringe model.
As in Glazer and McMillan (1992) , the probability of regulatory intervention is greater the higher the price the …rm charges. If the …rm faces the possibility of regulatory intervention, it would internalize the regulatory threat and change its pricing decision in order to lower the probability of unfavorable actions by the regulator. We assume that a risk neutral …rm chooses a price that maximizes its expected pro…t by considering the probability of divestiture as a function of the price.
Basic setup
Throughout the paper, it is assumed that all functions are twice continuously di¤erentiable.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that there is currently a single dominant …rm, i.e., a monopoly …rm in the market in line with the arguments in Glazer and McMillan (1992) . A monopolist would engage in standard monopoly pricing when it does not face either regulation or regulatory threat. Let p m denote the monopoly price that maximizes the …rm's pro…t when any divestiture plan is not in place. This is the benchmark price initially charged by the …rm before the threat of regulatory intervention arises.
Choosing prices greater than the monopoly price, p m , does reduce the …rm's pro…t. Moreover, in face of regulatory threat, it would be harmful for the …rm to charge prices even greater than the monopoly price as this would make the regulator more severe in terms of its attitudes toward regulatory intervention. Thus, we can focus our attention on the relevant interval [0; p m ].
1
In other words, the …rm will choose a price such that
Let (p) denote the pro…t of the …rm without divestiture, which we assume to be strictly concave in p, that is, 00 (p) < 0.
2 Here, p m is such that 1 The regulator may cap the price at p m . 2 One of the su¢ cient conditions for the concavity of (p) is that the demand function max (p), and by considering an interior solution, Figure 1 illustrates that the …rm initially chooses p m by equating its marginal revenue to its marginal cost at point G. The area OBCG corresponds to the maximized pro…t (p m ).
(Figure 1 about here)
The regulator can divest a certain portion of the …rm's manufacturing plants. This portion is predetermined politically (for example, …ve percent) based on some political or legal constraints. More formally, suppose that the …rm initially has i identical manufacturing plants. The regulator can separate the predetermined j plants from the …rm. As a result, the dominant …rm will operate the remaining i j plants after divestiture and the marginal cost curve of the …rm will shift leftward as illustrated in Figure 1 .
3 The divested j plants are then assumed to form a competitive fringe. This newly created fringe …rm is assumed to be a price-taker as it is supposed to remain small. Then, the dominant …rm's residual demand curve is the horizontal di¤erence between the market demand curve and the competitive fringe's marginal cost curve, i.e., supply curve. Consequently, the demand curve for the dominant …rm will shift leftward as depicted in Figure 1 Let d (p) denote the pro…t of the dominant …rm when divestiture is actually carried out. We assume that d (p) is strictly concave, that is,
Note that d can be regarded as a constant value since the divestiture portion is assumed to be politically predetermined. Figure 1 illustrates that the dominant …rm chooses p d by equating its residual marginal revenue to its marginal cost after divestiture at point H. The area OADH corresponds to the maximized pro…t d .
It should be noted that the maximized pro…t after divestiture is less than that without divestiture: that is, d < (p m ) holds with p d < p m , as depicted in Figure 1 . 4 As (p m ) is the maximum, (p d ) < (p m ) holds when the is concave and the cost function is convex. See, for example, Tirole (1988) . 3 Even if we do not assume identical manufacturing plants, the regulator would be able to undertake the divestiture in such a way that the marginal cost curve of the …rm shifts leftward. 4 Some readers might wonder whether p d < p m always holds. McElroy (1985) examines a dominant …rm-competitive fringe framework and proves that p d < p m holds true (Theorem A.1). divestiture plan is not in place. Note that (p d ) corresponds to the area OAEF without divestiture. Furthermore, as both the marginal cost curve and the demand curve shift leftward after divestiture, d , namely the area OADH, is smaller than (p d ) ( < (p m )). Of course, the regulator would want to divest the dominant …rm in an e¤ort to reduce the …rm's monopoly pro…t.
Let p l denote the price such that (p l ) = d . Lowering the price below p m decreases the pro…t without divestiture, (p). There is a lower bound p l that equates (p l ) to d . Moreover, if the …rm lowers the price even below
Lastly, we introduce a functional relationship between the probability of divestiture and the price set by the dominant …rm. Glazer and McMillan (1992) de…ne the probability of regulatory intervention as an increasing function of the price. 5 Following Glazer and McMillan, we express the probability of divestiture as (p) in the interval [0; p m ]. We assume that (p) is increasing, i.e., 0 (p) > 0, considering that the higher the …rm sets the price, the higher the probability of divestiture. Furthermore, we assume the strict convexity of (p), i.e., 00 (p) > 0, considering that the probability of divestiture steeply increases as the price becomes closer to the initial monopoly price p m . Note that 0 (p) 1 with (0) = 0 and (p m ) = 1.
Expected pro…t and penalty
When the …rm chooses some price level p 2 [0; p m ], it will earn (p) with probability 1 (p), still remaining undivested. On the other hand, the …rm will be actually divested with probability (p). Once the divestiture is realized, the …rm will earn d , which is a predetermined constant, by switching to p d . 6 Considering a risk neutral …rm, we can express its expected pro…t as:
The second term in the second line of (1) can be interpreted as a form of expected penalty. When the …rm chooses some price level, its pro…t (p) will be reduced by (p) d with probability (p) from divestiture. We here express the expected penalty as (p):
Moreover, the marginal expected penalty is expressed as:
Using (p), which is regarded as a cost by the …rm, we can rewrite the expected pro…t simply as:
E¤ects of Regulatory Threat
We now examine the e¤ects of regulatory threat on prices. Under regulatory threat, the …rm maximizes its expected pro…t e (p). Let p denote the maximizer of e (p). The following proposition demonstrates that the …rm is induced to lower the price from the initial monopoly price, when faced with regulatory threat.
Proposition 1 Under regulatory threat, the …rm chooses p such that p l < p < p m , where p is unique.
Proof. It follows from the setup in Subsection 2.2 that:
The …rst term on the right-hand side of the …rst equation is strictly negative since 0 (p m ) > 0 and d < (p m ). The second term is zero from the …rst-order condition, 0 (p m ) = 0, for the pro…t maximization problem without divestiture.
0 e (p m ) < 0 implies that the …rm can increase its expected pro…t by lowering the price below p m . Thus, p < p m . The following also holds for p p l from the setup in Subsection 2.2:
The …rst term on the right-hand side of the …rst equation is nonnegative since 0 (p) > 0 and (p) d for p p l . The second term is strictly positive since 1 (p) > 0 and
0 e (p) > 0 for p p l implies that the …rm can increase its expected pro…t by increasing the price above p l . Thus, p l < p . Furthermore, the second-order derivative of e (p) yields:
All terms on the right-hand side of the …rst equation are strictly negative for p l < p < p m . Therefore, e (p) is strictly concave, and hence has a unique maximum p for p l < p < p m .
This proposition coincides with the result in Glazer and McMillan (1992), which shows that the threat of regulation induces a monopolist to charge a price lower than the monopoly price.
We next compare regulatory threat, which is uncertain (stochastic) regulatory intervention, with one hundred percent certain (deterministic) intervention. Suppose that the regulator had already decided upon divestiture, and indeed divested the …rm with one hundred percent certainty at the beginning. This case can be regarded as deterministic regulatory intervention, where the …rm chooses the maximizer of d (p), i.e., p d . 7 An important question is the extent to which the …rm lowers its price under uncertain regulatory intervention. One may conjecture that the …rm would not lower the price as low as that under deterministic intervention, i.e., p d . However, it is shown that this is not always the case. We now show the following proposition:
Proposition 2 The price under regulatory threat is lower than that under deterministic intervention if and only if the marginal expected penalty is 7 It can also be interpreted that deterministic intervention is a special case of uncertain intervention in which the probability of divestiture is one for any price, that is, (p) = 1. In this special case, e (p) = d (p) indeed holds.
greater than the marginal pro…t without divestiture when evaluated at the price under deterministic intervention. That is, p < p d if and only if
Proof. We …rst prove that
This implies that the …rm can increase its expected pro…t by lowering the price below p d . Thus, p < p d . Next, we prove that
When the marginal expected penalty is greater than the marginal pro…t without divestiture, it is pro…table for the …rm to reduce the price. Proposition 2 implies that when
, the …rm can increase its expected pro…t e (p) by reducing the price below p d until 0 (p ) = 0 (p ) holds. In other words, under regulatory threat, the …rm chooses p , such that the marginal pro…t without divestiture is equalized with the marginal expected penalty.
The regulator may wish to decrease the price by undertaking deterministic regulatory intervention. However, uncertain regulatory intervention, i.e., regulatory threat may outperform deterministic intervention in terms of a price reduction in some cases. It would be surprising that regulatory threat may induce the …rm to decrease the price even more than deterministic intervention.
Numerical Examples
Setup
We consider numerical examples to illustrate the e¤ects of divestiture as regulatory threat. Our focus here is on the e¤ects of regulatory threat on prices. The inverse demand function is given by p = q + 100. The marginal cost of the original monopoly …rm is given by 0:25q.
Two cases of divestiture with di¤erent scales are considered. As discussed earlier, the divestiture portion is predetermined under some political or legal constraints. We assume that these constraints allow relatively small-scale divestiture in Case 1, and relatively large-scale divestiture in Case 2. In Case 1, the marginal cost of the competitive fringe that is separated from the original …rm is assumed to be 5q. Then, the marginal cost of the dominant …rm after divestiture can be derived as ( q + 100) (the demand curve also shifts leftward). In Case 2, the marginal cost of the competitive fringe is assumed to be 2q. Then, the marginal cost of the dominant …rm after divestiture can be derived as ( q + 100). Here p m is calculated as 55.56, which is the monopoly price when any divestiture plan is not in place. Furthermore, p d , which denotes the price after divestiture, is obtained as 47.35 and 39.22 in Case 1 and Case 2, respectively. Note that p d in Case 2 is lower than that in Case 1 since the portion of divestiture is larger in Case 2.
Lastly, we assume that the probability of divestiture is expressed as (p) = p pm in the interval [0; p m ], where 1. Note that (p) is increasing and convex. As shown in Figure 2 , the curvature of (p) becomes larger as increases. can be regarded as a given proxy parameter for the regulator's attitude (tendency) toward regulatory intervention. When is relatively small, the …rm would still face a non-negligible probability of divestiture, even if it chooses relatively low prices. In contrast, when is relatively large, the probability of divestiture becomes signi…cantly low and negligible if the …rm chooses relatively low prices. Thus, roughly speaking, a small would correspond to a relatively severe attitude of the regulator toward intervention, whereas a large would correspond to a relatively mild attitude. This would be determined by political conditions. (Figure 2 about here) 
Case 1: Relatively small-scale divestiture
We …rst examine the case of relatively small-scale divestiture, in which p d is relatively high. Figure 3 illustrates the results for = 3 in Case 1. The price under regulatory threat is shown to be lower than that under deterministic intervention; that is, p = 45:18 is lower than p d = 47:35. Indeed, the marginal expected penalty is greater than the marginal pro…t without divestiture when evaluated at the price under deterministic intervention; that is, the condition Figure 5 illustrates the prices p that the dominant …rm chooses under di¤erent levels of .
, and hence p < p d hold when is less than about 10 in Case 1. It should be emphasized that in the case of relatively small-scale divestiture, the price under regulatory threat may be lower than that under deterministic intervention, within a relatively broad range of , i.e., a broad range of regulator's attitudes toward regulatory intervention.
( Figure 5 about here) 
Case 2: Relatively large-scale divestiture
We next examine the case of relatively large-scale divestiture, in which p d becomes relatively low. Figure 6 illustrates the results for = 3 in Case 2. Contrary to Case 1, the price under regulatory threat is higher than that under deterministic intervention; that is, p = 41:39 is higher than
( Figure 6 about here)
Note that a smaller p d yields a larger
.76 in Case 2, which is almost doubled compared to that in Case 1. As shown in Figure 7 , the condition Figure 8 illustrates the prices p that the dominant …rm chooses under di¤erent levels of in Case 2. In this case, the condition
, and hence p < p d do not hold even if has a low value. This result suggests that, in the case of relatively large-scale divestiture, the price under regulatory threat may be higher than that under deterministic intervention for a relatively broad range of .
( Figure 8 about here) 
Policy implications
The examples above illustrate that in the case of relatively small-scale divestiture, the price under regulatory threat may be even lower than that under deterministic intervention within a relatively broad range of regulator's attitudes toward regulatory intervention. When p d under deterministic intervention is relatively high, the likelihood increases that it is pro…table for the …rm to choose p < p d under regulatory threat.
In some industries, such as the electric power industry, the regulator often attempts to divest a certain portion of the dominant …rm's plants to mitigate market power. It is often the case that this portion determined through a political process is very limited because of some political or legal constraints. The regulator may want to rely on deterministic regulatory intervention in order to decrease the price. However, when the scale of divestiture is limited, uncertain regulatory intervention, i.e., regulatory threat may outperform deterministic intervention in terms of a price reduction.
Concluding Remarks
This paper has investigated the pricing decision of the dominant …rm under regulatory threat, considering the probability of intervention as a function of the price. Our focus is particularly on the case where the potential divestiture of the …rm serves as a threat of regulatory intervention. We have compared regulatory threat, which can be viewed as uncertain (stochastic) intervention, with one hundred percent certain (deterministic) intervention. The regulator may wish to decrease the price by undertaking deterministic regulatory intervention. However, regulatory threat outperforms deterministic intervention in terms of a price reduction under certain conditions associated with the marginal expected penalty. Numerical examples illustrate that in the case of relatively small-scale divestiture, the price under regulatory threat may indeed be lower than that under deterministic intervention, within a relatively broad range of regulator's attitudes toward intervention. Finally, we mention some possible directions for future research. We have considered uncertain divestiture of the …rm as regulatory threat. A fruitful avenue of research would be to investigate the di¤erent types of regulatory intervention possible in real markets. In this paper, we have examined regulatory threat based on a dominant …rm-competitive fringe model. Further work should aim to extend the model to oligopolistic cases, such as Cournot competition. Although we have focused on a static model, investigating dynamic regulatory intervention under changing political environment would be another interesting direction for future research. 
